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South Africa is a water-stressed country where water availability is an important constraint to 
economic and social development, and will become even more so in the future if this scarce 
resource is not managed effectively.  In order to manage this scarce supply of water, we need to 
value it. This study focuses on the value of water in the agricultural sector, in particular the 
marginal revenue of water for six irrigation commodities namely avocados, bananas, grapefruit, 
mangoes, oranges and sugarcane.   A quadratic production function was fitted with an SUR 
model specification in a panel data study from 1975 to 2002 to obtain marginal revenue functions 
for each of the six commodities.  We found that mangoes are the most efficient commodity in its 
water use relative to revenue generated (marginal revenue of water equals R25.43/m³ in 2002) 
and sugarcane the least efficient (marginal revenue of water equals R1.67/m³ in 2002).   The 
marginal revenue of water is not an indication of the true “market” price.  Neither is it an 
indication what the administered price should be.  The marginal revenue of water is rather a 
guideline for policy makers to determine which industries or commodities within an industry can 
generate the largest revenue per unit water applied  
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South Africa is a water-stressed country where water availability is an important constraint to 
economic and social development.  This development constraint is likely to escalate in future if 
water resources are not properly managed as a national asset as well as to the overall social 
benefit of the nation (Nieuwoudt et al., 2004).  In order to manage this resource duly we need to 
value it, but the very nature of this commodity makes valuation difficult.  Water is traditionally 
regarded as a public good, which makes management strategies of water pricing and allocation an 
extremely sensitive topic.   
 
Supply-side solutions, such as the Working for Water programme, offers limited relief to meeting 
the increasing demand for water, while demand management programmes, such as the 
introduction of water efficiency technologies and increased water prices, may lead to a reduction 
in water consumption, but at the cost of reduced incomes, employment and consumer welfare.  
Rising marginal costs of water provision, increasing scarcity of water, and future threats related 
to unsustainable water management, require strategies and solutions that focus on demand side 
solutions which are socially fair and economically viable (Grimble, 1999).  The valuation of 
water in the economy, within the different sectors of the economy or production processes, could 
be a useful tool for policy makers in the decision-making process regarding these management 
strategies and solutions.  
 
This study focuses on the valuation of water in the production processes of six agricultural 
commodities.  The agricultural sector - specifically irrigation agriculture - was chosen, since this 
sector is currently the largest user of water within the South African economy, using 59 percent 
of water supply in South Africa (DWAF, 2002).  Agriculture by its very nature is generally, not 
only in South Africa, a high water user relative to GDP and employment when compared to other 
industries.  One cubic meter of water adds R1.50 to GDP in agriculture compared to R157.40 in 
industry, R39.50 in mining and R44.40 in eco-tourism (Niewoudt et al., 2004).  Even though 
agriculture generates less output per unit of water, it still is, however, the leader in creating jobs 
per value of output among the different sectors.  In agriculture R1 million creates 24 jobs 
compared to the 10.9 jobs created by mining (Nieuwoudt et al., (2004)).   
 
The main objective of this study is to estimate marginal revenue functions for each of the six 
commodities chosen.  Once these functions have been estimated the respective marginal revenues 
for each of these commodities can be compared with one another for every year of the study 
sample.  Marginal revenue of water measures the opportunity cost of water, or the forgone 
revenue at the margin and can thus be defined as the revenue that an additional unit of water will 
generate.  Comparing the marginal value of water for different commodities will allow us to rank 
commodities according to their revenue efficiency relative to water use in and during the 
production processes.  This information can be helpful to policy makers in the optimum 
allocation of water rights to agricultural producers in areas where water is relatively scarce.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: the first section contains a concise literature review, 
followed by the methodology implemented in the estimation process in section two.  The third 
section contains the data and empirical estimation results, whilst section four details an analysis 
of the estimation results, which is followed by a conclusion. 
 1. LITERATURE  REVIEW 
 
In many countries, governments, through different pricing and allocation strategies, manages 
water supplies.  These strategies are normally not based on economic efficiency, but rather on 
social and distribution criteria such as fairness and/or equity.  The National Water Act (RSA, 
1998) endorses these principles as well.  As an example, many households are granted the first 
6kl of water per month free of charge as being a basic human right.  Additionally, administered 
prices (or tariffs), which are based on structures such as flat rates and decreasing block rates, 
discourage efficient water use even further since it does not reflect increasing scarcity with 
increasing use of the resource.  Small-scale water users are therefore paying more per unit of 
water use than large-scale users.  This is because the water tariff structure is based on cost 
recovery rather than on managing the resource per se.  If tariffs do not reflect the value of the 
resources, or if they are designed improperly, they will not send the right signals to users, which 
in turn will discourage conservation (Dinar and Subramanian, 1998). 
 
Conversely, water markets have the ability to allocate water to the most efficient user.  Water 
markets, however, are by no means suited as pricing strategy for all uses, for example water 
markets in household use will result in high value users bidding up the market clearing prices 
which will have social costs to low-income consumers whom will be forced to spend large 
proportions of their income on water. 
 
Shadow pricing serves as a better signal of the value of water than administered prices.  A 
shadow price measures the unit cost as an opportunity cost to society of engaging in some 
economic activity.  Shadow prices are applied in situations where actual prices cannot be charged 
or where actual prices charged do not reflect the real sacrifice made when some activity is 
pursued (Bannock et al., 1998:378).  In a perfectly competitive economy the market will clear 
where prices are equal to marginal cost, in which case the prices will reflect the true cost to 
society of producing one extra unit of a commodity.  The shadow price (marginal revenue) of 
water is thus a better indication of the value of water than administered prices (Moore, 1999).    
 
{INSERT TABLE 1} 
 
Table 1 lists some of the studies conducted on the marginal value of water in South Africa, in 
particular for the agricultural industry.  It is evident that across regions, as well as methodologies, 
the marginal values differ significantly. 
 
Louw (2001) evaluated the impact of a potential water market on the efficient utilisation of water 
in the Berg River basin.  He utilised a positive mathematical programming model to develop a 
methodology to determine the true value of water and found significant differences in the value 
of water between areas in the basin, with the marginal value of water ranging between as low as 
R0/m³ and as high as R20/m³ in this region.  These differences indicate that there are significant 
gains possible from trade between these areas.  Bate et al. (1999) studied the value of water 
through actual water trading in the Crocodile River catchment and found much lower values for 
water than the other studies (Conradie, 2002 and Louw, 2001).  The outcomes obtained by the 
Bate et al. (1999) study correspond with the values of international studies (see Table 2), with 
water values ranging between 18.67c/m³ and 23c/m³.  Bate et al. (1999) also found that the value 
of water is the highest in tropical fruit production and the lowest in sugarcane.  
International studies, on the marginal value of water, such as Moore (1999) and Faux and Perry 
(1999), found values ranging between 2.6c/m³ and 23.2c/m³ (Table 2).  Moore (1999) estimated a 
panel data econometric model with a Kmenta-type error structure in order to obtain shadow price 
(marginal revenue) functions for water.  Faux and Perry (1999) applied a hedonic price analysis 
to agricultural land sales to reveal the implicit market price of water in irrigation. 
  
{INSERT TABLE 2} 
 
Building on the general domestic and international frameworks that were reviewed in this 
section, this study will focus on the agricultural sector, and specifically on irrigated commodities.  
The agricultural sector was chosen, as it is the largest user of water supply in South Africa. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY   
 
A production function approach is used to estimate a revenue function; a marginal revenue 
function for water is then derived from this estimated revenue function.  This study is based on 
the methodology developed and performed by Moore (1999) on a panel data study of shadow 
prices for water for 13 water districts in California.   
 
Since water prices are generally set administratively rather than being market-determined; water 
prices serve neither a rationing nor allocative function (Moore, 1999) and are thus normally 
modelled as a fixed input.  Based on this, the marginal revenue function for water is estimated 
under the assumption that production is quantity-rationed rather than price-allocated. Farmers are 
constrained by the availability of water rather than the cost or price of water; one reason could be 
that the cost of water relative to the total production cost is very small.   
 
2.1 Revenue  function 
 
A revenue function is estimated for each commodity, where the revenue function is a function of 
the price of the commodity, the quantity of water used in the production process of that 
commodity and a composite variable input factor. 
 
The revenue function is defined as: 
 
() ( ) { 0 p , comp w, Y y : y p max comp w, p, R
y
> } ∈ ⋅ = ,     (1) 
Where p is a vector of output prices, y is a vector of crop outputs, w is the water used in 
production and comp is the composite input factor. 
 
2.2  Marginal revenue function or shadow price function 
 
The marginal revenue function of water for each commodity is derived from the revenue function 
of that particular commodity and is defined as: 
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w
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∂
∂ )        ( 2 )   
The marginal revenue function (shadow price function) of water measures the unit cost as the 
opportunity cost, or forgone revenue at the margin. 
 
The revenue function (equation 1) is estimated econometrically using a quadratic functional form.  
The quadratic form has been applied often in agricultural production studies (Huffman, 1988; 
Moore and Dinar, 1995 and Moore, 1999).  The marginal revenue function is then derived from 
the estimated quadratic revenue function. 
 
3.  DATA AND ESTIMATION RESULTS  
 
The data for the study constitute a panel data set for the period 1975–2002, with six cross-
sections namely avocado, banana, grapefruit, mango, orange and sugarcane.  The data set 
contains South African agricultural data has 168 observations.  Table 3 contains a list and 
description of the variables for each cross-section. 
 
{INSERT TABLE 3} 
 
Since the number of cross sections is less than the number of coefficients, a random effects model 
could not be estimated.  Theory places one restriction on the marginal revenue function of water 
(equation 2) in that the marginal revenue function must be positive.  Intuitively we would expect 
that the function would have a negative slope and a positive intercept.  Fixed effects models 
(Within and Least squares dummy variable) were fitted to the data but yielded positive slope 
coefficients for the marginal revenue functions of water and were disregarded, as it did not 
adhere to economic theory.   
 
A quadratic revenue function was subsequently fitted to the data with a Cross-section SUR 
(Seemingly unrelated regressions) model.  Testing for serial correlation indicated the presence of 
serial correlation in the residuals (LM-statistic = 93.132).  Due to strong heterogeneity across 
cross-sections, individual rho-values were calculated for each of the cross-sections instead of a 
pooled rho.  Large differences amongst the rho-values confirmed that the degree of serial 
correlation across cross-sections differs.  After correction of the data by the individual rho-values, 
the test for serial correlation failed to reject the null hypothesis of non-serially correlated error 
terms (LM-statistic = 4.39), indicating that the problem of serial correlation no longer persists.   
We addressed the problem of heteroscedasticity by imposing a White’s cross-section 
heteroscedastic structure on the error term in the original model.  The Cross-section SUR model 
allows for contemporaneous correlation between cross-sections.  A feasible GLS specification 
was estimated and both cross-section heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation was 
corrected.  
 
The final SUR model, after correction for serial correlation and adjustment for heteroscedasticity, 
is summarized in Table 4.  A very high Adjusted R-squared value of 0.99 indicates that the SUR 
model represents a good fit to the data, supported by a significant F-statistic of 1661.25.  The 
coefficient of W² (-4.29), which determines the slope of the marginal revenue function, is not 
only negative but also significant (t-statistic=-4.07).  The coefficients of the interaction variables 
that contain W, which influences the intercept of the derived marginal revenue function of water, are almost all significant at the 5 percent level, and the combinations of these coefficients yield 
positive intercepts for each commodity.   
 
{INSERT TABLE 4} 
 
4.  ANALYSIS OF THE ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
Marginal revenue functions for each of the six cross-sections (commodities) were derived from 
the cross-section SUR model.  Based on the results in section 3, the marginal revenue function 
(equation 2) can be specified as:  
 
  it it it i it 4.23P 0.18Comp 8.57W C MR + + − =       ( 3 )  
 
The slope coefficients for water, composite factor and price are the same for all cross-sections 
(commodities) while the intercept differs for each of the commodities.  We do not allow for 
variation in the slope of the marginal revenue function of water among commodities but we do 
allow for variation in the intercept of the commodities through the SUR model specification.  
From equation 3 it is now possible to calculate the marginal revenue for a specific year for each 
of the six agricultural commodities.  Table 5 shows the marginal revenue of water for each 
commodity for the years 1999 and 2002, but it can be calculated for any year in the sample of 
1975 to 2002.  These years were chosen because it is towards the end of the sample period and 
the values obtained for 1999 are comparable to the results of Olbrich and Hassan (1999).  To 
compare the two studies we also ranked the commodities according to their marginal value of 
water from the most efficient commodity in water use relative to revenue generated to the least 
efficient commodity. 
 
{INSERT TABLE 5} 
 
Our results correspond largely to those obtained by Olbrich and Hassan (1999) who made use of 
a different method (net terminal value).  The net terminal value represents the present worth at 
the end of the cycle or rotation of the stream of net benefits generated in future years (Olbrich 
and Hassan, 1999).  Both studies found that mangoes are the most efficient agricultural 
commodity among the six commodities evaluated and sugarcane the least efficient.  The shadow 
price of water or the opportunity cost of water in mango production for the year 1999 of 
R20.64/m³ is much higher than the forgone revenue in the sugarcane production of R2.67/m³ for 
the same year.   The results are also similar to the study of Louw (2001) in the Berg River basin, 
where the marginal value of water ranging between R0/m³ and R20/m³ in this area.  Louw (2001) 
also found tropical fruit to yield a higher marginal value of water than sugarcane. 
 
A result obtained from our model that needs further explanation is the change in the ranks of 
banana and orange from the year 1999 to 2002.  In 2002 bananas outperformed oranges with the 
marginal value of water equal to R8.25/m³ and R7.97/m³ respectively.  In 1999 oranges (marginal 
revenue of water = R7.02/m³) is ranked more efficient than bananas (marginal revenue of 
water = R6.2/m³).   Inspection of the raw data showed that the revenue in the orange production 
is 25.5% higher in year 2002 than in 1999, whilst the revenue in the banana production grew by 
20.1%.  The growth in the orange production can be contributed to growth in the overall output of 9.4% as well as a price increase of 9.3%.  The overall production of bananas decreased by 
8.3% from 1999 to 2002 but a growth of 30.9% in the price led to a net growth in the revenue.  
That said, it should be noted that, firstly, the size of the difference between the marginal value of 
water for bananas and oranges is relatively small  (25c/m³ in 2002 and 82c/m³ in 1999), and 
secondly, Olbrich and Hassan (1999) ranked bananas and oranges as equally efficient. 
 
5. CONCLUSION   
 
The question now arises: what is the contribution of a study like this one, in which the value of 
water is estimated?  The shadow price or marginal revenue of water is not an indication of what 
the true trading price or the administered price of water should be.  It serves as a guideline for 
allocation policies, to determine the industries or commodities within an industry in which water 
can generate the largest revenue per unit of water input.  It is also an indication of how market 
players might react to the presence of pricing strategies such as water markets.  It is evident from 
the large spread in the forgone revenue between the mango and sugarcane industry that the 
mango industry would be able to bid away water from the sugarcane industry in a region where 
these two commodities compete for the same scarce water resource.   
 
The pricing strategy for water use charges in terms of section 56(1) of the National Water Act 
(No. 36 of 1998) aims to achieve the efficient and cost-effective allocation of water, equity and 
fairness in the allocation mechanism, and long-term sustainability of the natural environment 
(RSA, 1999).  Marginal value of water functions can be used as a tool in the evaluation of the 
efficiency of allocation of water, but should not be regarded as an all-inclusive indicator in the 
pricing or allocation mechanism, since they do not take social costs such as employment, equity 
or fairness into account.  What it can do is shed some light on the cost of government 
subsidisation of water-inefficient commodities.  Given the fact that the challenge for South Africa 
is to address poverty, job creation and economic development within the framework of 
sustainable management strategies of our natural resources, considering the issue of water 
subsidisation in policy formulation, might prove toe be a good investment for future generations. Table 1:  South African studies on the marginal value of water 
Study Year  Region  Method  Marginal value of 
water 
Conradie  2002  Fish-Sundays river Econometric Model R2.40/m³ 
Louw 2001  Berg  River  basin Mathematical 
programming model R0/m³-R20/m³ 
Bate et al. 1999  Crocodile River 
catchment  Water Trading  18.76c/m³-22.75c/m³ 
Source: Own summary of results in Nieuwoudt et al. (2004) and Blignaut and De Wit (2004). 
 Table 2:  International studies on the marginal value of water 
Study Year  Region  Method  Marginal value of 
water ($/acre-feet) 
Marginal value of 
water (R/m³) 
Moore  1999  California  Panel data study $5-$15 per acre-feet  2.6c/m³-7.9c/m³ 
Faux & Perry  1999  Oregon  Hedonic Price 
Analysis  $9-$44 per acre-feet  4.7c/m³-23.2c/m³ 
Source: Own summary of results in Moore (1999) and Faux and Perry (1999).  Conversion: R6.5/US$. Table 3:  Variables and description 
Variable Description  Unit  Source 
R Revenue  R  ('000) 
Agricultural Statistics of the 
National Department of 
Agriculture 
P  Price of commodity  R/ton 
Agricultural Statistics of the 
National Department of 
Agriculture 
W  Water used in production 
of commodity  Million m³  WRC Studies 
Comp  Composite input factor  Ha under irrigation
Agricultural Statistics of the 
National Department of 
Agriculture 
Source: Own summary 
 Table 4:  Estimates of the quadratic revenue function: An SUR Model 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error t-Statistic P-value 
P  36.04  8.20 4.39 0.000 
Comp  -4.65  1.31 -3.55 0.001 
P²  -0.01  0.01 -1.55 0.123 
Comp²  0.00  0.00 -0.53 0.597 
P*Comp  0.01  0.01 0.73 0.465 
P*W  4.23  1.08 3.93 0.000 
Comp*W  0.18  0.04 4.56 0.000 
W²  -4.29  1.05 -4.07 0.000 
ADV W       1148.69  859.85 1.34 0.184 
BAN W        -827.13  411.51 -2.01 0.046 
GRF W        -900.76  1264.68 -0.71 0.477 
MAN W       9917.58  1681.19 5.90 0.000 
ORA W      -2603.96  576.36 -4.52 0.000 
SUC W        -962.68  345.72 -2.78 0.006 
ADV C      -9975.40  2806.10 -3.55 0.001 
BAN C      19643.80  8800.02 2.23 0.027 
GRF C  15011.20  9266.98 1.62 0.107 
MAN C  -12361.20  3060.86 -4.04 0.000 
ORA C  136051.90  27933.77 4.87 0.000 
SUC C  76438.33  16740.42 4.57 0.000 
          
Adjusted R-squared  0.995    
F-statistic 1661.25     
Note: P  =  price; Comp = composite  input  factor;  W = water  used  in  production;  C = constant,  ADV = avocado; 
BAN = banana; GRF = grapefruit; MAN = mango; ORA = orange; SUC = sugarcane Table 5:  Marginal revenue and net terminal value of water 
Commodity  Own analysis for the 
year 2002 
Own analysis for the 
year 1999 
Olbrich & Hassan 
WRC Report 666/1/99 
  
MRW (R/m³)  Rank  MRW (R/m³) Rank  NTV (R/m³)  Rank 
Avocado  17.45   2  11.98  2  4 – 7  3 
Banana  8.25   4  6.2  5  4 – 7  3 
Grapefruit  9.92   3  8.7  3  7 –10  2 
Mango 25.43   1  20.64  1  >10  1 
Orange  7.97   5  7.02  4  4 – 7  3 
Sugarcane  1.67    6 2.67 6 1  –2 6 
Source: Own summary 
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